Lecturers
BiographyG. Mosconi - University of Milan - Bicocca (ITA)
Abstract
"Human thought and rationality"
The psychological research on reasoning, particularly from the pile of experimental trials on fallacy and inclinations of systematic errors (biases), considers the human being to be a bad reasoner, so according to P. Wason one must answer affirmatively to the question of J. Cohen if “human irrationality can be shown experimentally”.
An analogous orientation similar to the one clearly expressed by Wason, is found in the research of Tversky and Kahneman on probability assessments in situations of uncertainty.
Substantially different is the picture and identity kit of the subject that results from the research on problem solving, another principle sector of the psychology of thought in the second half of the last century. Here we have to do with solvers exposed to failure, but who cope with it reasonably, and not rarely with success, by the characteristics and limits of their cognitive system.
This relevant discrepancy derives from the fact that the research on reasoning, different from that on problem solving, is always characterized by the reference to an extrapsychological norm (like logic or the theory of probability) and that commonly the experimental task is identified with a logical exercise often presented in a masked form. This showed that the responses of the subjects were assessed according to “the rules of the game” of the proven normative theory as a reference, without considering theoretically relevant that such rules can noticeably pull away from those of common speech, and therefore from the base rules of production and comprehension of speech.
Abstract
"Human thought and rationality"
The psychological research on reasoning, particularly from the pile of experimental trials on fallacy and inclinations of systematic errors (biases), considers the human being to be a bad reasoner, so according to P. Wason one must answer affirmatively to the question of J. Cohen if “human irrationality can be shown experimentally”.
An analogous orientation similar to the one clearly expressed by Wason, is found in the research of Tversky and Kahneman on probability assessments in situations of uncertainty.
Substantially different is the picture and identity kit of the subject that results from the research on problem solving, another principle sector of the psychology of thought in the second half of the last century. Here we have to do with solvers exposed to failure, but who cope with it reasonably, and not rarely with success, by the characteristics and limits of their cognitive system.
This relevant discrepancy derives from the fact that the research on reasoning, different from that on problem solving, is always characterized by the reference to an extrapsychological norm (like logic or the theory of probability) and that commonly the experimental task is identified with a logical exercise often presented in a masked form. This showed that the responses of the subjects were assessed according to “the rules of the game” of the proven normative theory as a reference, without considering theoretically relevant that such rules can noticeably pull away from those of common speech, and therefore from the base rules of production and comprehension of speech.